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Despite the partial realignment of European long-term government bonds after the crisis in 
2012, there has been some renewed divergence in yields in the last years. We analyse the 
sources of these divergences and find that the government bond markets in the Eurozone 
are highly sensitive to changing market sentiments, both in time and across countries. We 
analyse the implications of this finding for the QE-programme. Our analysis of the recent 
developments in the bond markets and in the macroeconomic developments of the euro 
area suggests that pulling the plug on QE too soon might undo some of the benefits of QE 
in the countries of the periphery and may lead to increases in the refinancing costs of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Low yields on sovereign bonds have characterized the post-crisis scenario with QE 
interventions preventing a return of bond yields closer to nominal growth rates. However, 
most recently, capital markets appeared prone to volatility, with long-term rates being on 
the rise again since the end of the second half of 2016. This trend is in line with the recent 
increase in the headline inflation. An important factor in explaining inflation dynamics is the 
contagion from the US bond market due to the expected tightening of the Fed’s monetary 
policy, and a weaker euro. However, this renewed divergence in yields runs contrary to 
improving or plateauing fundamentals, thus not necessarily signalling a return to a more 
“neutral” level of bond yields. The observed divergence may be the results of a tug of war 
between opposing forces – with political risk, lack of structural reforms, meagre growth 
prospects, and the existence of technical limits regarding QE purchases (Gerba and 
Macchiarelli, 2016) preventing a lingering of low nominal bond yields, particularly in 
southern euro area countries. The continuation of such an upward trend could create 
additional trouble for the still fragile Euro area recovery and the smooth functioning of 
European capital markets. One cannot exclude the risk that the resumption of bond sell-off 
from investors could generate a rise in long-term interest rates to levels not in line with 
fundamentals (see De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; 2013), thereby endangering the smooth 
functioning of monetary policy and adding pressure to public finances. Against this 
background, this note assesses recent developments in European long-term bond rates, 
and discusses the risks of interest rates overshooting in the short term, and the 
implications for the European Central Bank. 
 
2. DIVERGENCE IN EUROZONE BOND YIELDS 
After the record-low level reached in 2015-2016, there has been renewed divergence in 
long term government bond yields, particularly during the last year. As observed from 
Figure 1(a), this runs contrary to improving or anyway plateauing fundamentals. In 
countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy, while increasing debt/GDP levels partly 
explained high bond yields during the sovereign debt crisis, debt ratios have stabilized 
since 2013 (Figure 1(b)). 
Figure 1(a): Euro area 10 bond yields 
10-year bond yields 
 
Source: Datastream data. Last observation: 2017Q1. Note: The euro area 10 excludes 
Luxemburg and includes Greece. 
Figure 1(b): Debt-to-GDP ratios for selected countries 
 
Source: Datastream data. Last observation: 2016Q4. 
Part of these dynamics is the result of headline inflation and market-based long-term 
inflation expectations being on the rise again (ECB data, not reported here). An important 
factor in explaining inflation dynamics is the the ECB’s QE that contributed to a weakening 
of the euro against the dollar. However, those increases in nominal government yields are 
more apparent in some countries (namely, Portugal, Italy, Spain) rather than in others. 
Figure 2(a): Spread and debt to GDP ratios in the Euro area 10 
10-year bond yields 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream data. Sample 2000Q1-2016Q4. Note: The 
euro area 10 excludes Luxemburg and includes Greece. 
 
 
Figure 2(a): Spread and debt to GDP ratios in the Eurozone 10 
10-year bond yields  
x-axis: debt-to-GDP (%); y-axis: government bond spread vis-à-vis Germany (%) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream data. Note: The euro area 10 excludes 
Luxemburg and includes Greece (notice the figure for Greece has a different scale). 
The relationship between debt/GDP and bond yields is not a linear one (Figure 2), 
particularly in euro area countries, where a systematic mispricing of sovereign risk has 
been documented at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; 2013; 
for a theoretical discussion see De Grauwe, 2011). This implies that, although 
fundamentals may have stabilised, bond sell-off from investors could still generate a rise in 
long-term interest rates to levels not in line with the fundamentals risk characteristics of 
these assets, whenever investors’ perception shift.  
In Figure 2, we look at the spreads (vertical axis) as a function of the debt-to-GDP ratios 
(horizontal axis) in selected eurozone countries. Each point is a particular observation of 
one of the countries in a particular quarter (sample period 2000Q1-2016Q4). De Grauwe 
and Ji (2012; 2013) observed a positive relation between the spread and the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. We equally find such a positive relationship by updating the sample with more recent 
figures (represented by the positively sloped regression line in Figure 2(a)). However, it 
appears that only a small fraction of the total variation of the spreads can be accounted for 
by the debt-to-GDP ratio. This seems to be a feature also of more recent observations (post 
OMT-announcement and QE, i.e. 2012Q3-2016Q4 highlighted in yellow and green 
respectively in Figure 2(b)) where changes in the observations away from the pre-crisis 
period seems to show a time dependency pattern. 
Figure 2(b) shows nevertheless that the perceived market risk of default and ensuing fire-
sale of bonds in Eurozone countries has overall dropped since the crisis (a result well 
documented by the literature in the light of the OMT-announcement and ensuing rounds of 
QE in Europe; see Altavilla et al. 2014; 2015)1, with the exception of Greece.  
In addition, although debt levels have not changed, the composition of that debt has 
changed, with almost 40% of the universe of government bonds trading at negative rates 
currently (Table 1). 
Table 1: Market volume of outstanding public debt with negative yields 
and yields below the ECB’s deposit rate for selected countries (in EUR bn) 
 
Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria Finland Luxemburg 
Less than 0% 66.2% 49.7% 56.5% 34.40% 47.80% 53.00% 37.70% 
Less than ECB's  
deposit facility  
(- 0.4%) 
52.2% 33.8% 33.2% 19.00% 30.40% 30.70% 0.00% 
 
Italy Spain Portugal  Ireland Cyprus Malta Euro area 
Less than 0% 16.4% 32.5% 11.10% 35.60% 5.50% 17.60% 39.90% 
Less than ECB's  
deposit facility  
(- 0.4%) 
2.3% 4.3% 0.00% 10.50% 1.10% 13.70% 22.60% 
Source: Bloomberg, AllianzGI Global Economics & Strategy data (Apr. 2017). Note: For 
Greece the market volume of outstanding public debt with negative yields and yields below 
the ECB’s deposit rate is 0%. 
                                                          
1 Still, a high level of fragmentation remains and recent data confirm that, in most countries, the 
ECB’s purchases have not completely reversed the home bias in banks’ holdings of government debt 
(Hüttl and Goncalves Raposo, 2017; see also Koutroumpis and Macchiarelli, 2016). 
While the story about bad debt dynamics is thus not too compelling, it should be 
understood that investors’ price sensitivity when interest rates are very low or negative is 
higher. As a result, losses for those investors highly exposed to low-yielding bonds with 
long maturities can be large even for relatively limited movements in underlying interest 
rates (ECB, 2016). This could partially explain markets’ nervousness.   
Figure 3: Dispersion of government bond yields and evolution of the 
average yield – euro area 10  
 
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream data. Source: The euro area 10 excludes 
Luxemburg and includes Greece.  
Table 2: Percentage of variance explained by the first principal component 






















Full-period 76.0% 88.2% 84.5% 72.8% 
      Pre-crisis 2000Q1-2007Q4 99.8% 99.8% 99.7% 99.4% 
Crisis I 2008Q1-2010Q2 72.3% 83.7% 56.4% 45.3% 
Crisis II (sovereign debt) 2010Q3-2012Q2 51.1% 72.9% 72.9% 73.3% 
Post OMT-announcement 2012Q3-2014Q4 84.4% 88.5% 97.8% 95.4% 














Source: Own calculations based on Datastream data. Source: The euro area 10 excludes 
Luxemburg.  
In order to analyze the determinants of bond spreads, we preliminary look at the cross-
country standard deviation of government bond yields for securities with long-maturity (10 
years) over the period 2001Q1-2017Q1 (Figure 3). The lower the dispersion in yields, the 
more integrated the market for government bonds. Focusing on the last couple of years, 
the measure suggests a renewed divergence of government bond yields in the euro area 
which – as discussed- cannot primarily be attributed primarily to the divergence in 
underlying fundamentals or a fundamental deterioration of the fiscal situation in several 
euro area countries. Besides the dispersion in yields, an alternative measure might be 
provided by a principal component analysis (Table 2). We run the analysis on the bond 
yields at the 10-year maturity for countries which were under financial distress during the 
sovereign debt crisis (Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland, plus Greece) and the rest of the Euro 
area 10. Consistent with our previous discussion, we can account for as much as 76% of 
the original variability of the yields across the euro area 10. This number jumps up to 88% 
when Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland are excluded. For Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland alone 
the principal component accounts for 85% of the yields’ variance. When adding Greece, this 
number drops down to 72%, confirming that Greece was very much an outlier. For the 
sovereign debt crisis and the post-OMT announcement, for Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland 
(and Greece) the variance accounted for altogether is higher than what the principal 
component can explain for the euro area 10. This suggests that the bond yield dynamics in 
those countries (Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland, plus Greece) possibly reflected factors of 
common nature, such as risk aversion. Common factors in those countries have weakened 
for the most recent period. In the next Section, we explore this idea more formally.  
 
3. HOW MUCH OF THESE CHANGES ARE FUNDAMENTALS? 
As always, it is critical to differentiate between change in investors’ sentiment and genuine 
changes in the economy’s fundamentals. In the next two sections, we present a survey of 
the literature on the determinants of sovereign bond yields. In Section 3.3, we propose an 
analysis of the determinants of the yield spreads based on an update of the reduced-form 
model proposed in De Grauwe and Ji (2012; 2013).  
3.1. The determinants of sovereign bond yields during the crisis 
Previous studies have suggested that the developments in sovereign bond spreads in euro 
area countries can be broadly explained by a set of determinants relating to credit and 
liquidity risk as well by the interaction of these risks with investors’ assessment of each 
country’s creditworthiness, or their aversion to risk, more generally. While credit and 
liquidity risks are mostly country-specific, the degree of risk aversion tends to reflect 
common or global factors and is typically regarded as one of the most relevant driver of 
fluctuations of bond yield spreads vis-à-vis the German Bund (ECB, 2014). The relevance of 
these determinants is likely to vary over time (see, e.g., D’Agostino and Ehrmann, 2014). 
In particular, during times of financial uncertainty – i.e. periods in which risk aversion is 
high – investors will rebalance their portfolio and will likely increase their holding of less 
risky securities. Sovereign bonds will thus become more sensitive to credit and liquidity 
risks. This is a recurring finding in the empirical literature since the start of the financial 
crisis (see Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012).  
The determinants of credit risk premia are typically associated with default risk (or the 
probability of government default), credit spread risk (the probability that the market value 
of bonds will decline relative to other comparable assets) and downgrade risk (the 
probability of a government downgrade). As such, credit risk is typically proxied by 
variables describing a country’s fiscal position (debt and deficit-to-GDP ratios, structure of 
debt maturity, interest expenditure-to-GDP etc.; see Barrios et al., 2009) and country 
ratings. Given that investors may be more interested in evaluating the fiscal outlook rather 
than current and past fiscal situations in order to assess the solvency of a country, several 
papers use the expected – rather than observed – fiscal fundamentals as explanatory 
variables in sovereign bond spreads. D’Agostino and Ehrmann (2014), for instance, extend 
the range of variables used in order to capture credit risk to the consensus forecasts of 
macroeconomic variables (current account balance-to-GDP ratio, real GDP growth, 
unemployment and consumer price inflation). Others, e.g., Maltritz (2012), have 
considered related variables such as openness and the terms of trade, or the countries’ 
financial sector soundness and price competitiveness as expressed by country ratings (Dötz 
and Fischer, 2010). Since the crisis, and to a larger extent, the sovereign debt crisis, the 
observed heightened importance for credit risk variables may be linked to the deterioration 
of fiscal positions in several euro area countries. For example, De Sanctis (2012), claims 
that fiscal developments are being taken into consideration by investors while assessing 
growth prospects and the government ability to debt-repayment, whereas Attinasi et al. 
(2010) suggest that the announcement of bank rescue packages, shifting risk from private 
to public sector, has led to a reassessment of sovereign credit risk (ECB, 2014). Other 
related variables include the existence of fiscal rules. Iara and Woldd (2010) suggest, for 
instance, how using a compilation of mix sources (statutory base, rule’s enforcement, 
media visibility etc.) their constructed index for fiscal rules is highly explanatory when 
investors became risk adverse. To a similar token, studies such as Eichler (2011) and Di 
Cesare et al. (2012) and Klose and Weigert (2014) explicitly explored the role for the risk 
of a EMU break-up.2 Similarly, analysing data up to June 2011, Favero and Missale (2012), 
concluded that the “non-default components [of sovereign bond spreads] are unlikely to 
reflect expectations of depreciation”. 
As a second factor, the liquidity of the various government bonds will most likely influence 
the yield spread. Liquidity is frequently measured by the overall outstanding amount of 
public debt, bid-ask spreads and trading volumes (Beber et al., 2009; Bernoth and 
Erdogan, 2012). Beber et al. (2009) find, for instance, that credit premia tend to be 
generally more relevant than liquidity premia for euro area sovereign bonds but liquidity 
factors may well prevail during periods of increased uncertainty. 
Finally, the degree of investors’ risk perception is normally proxied by the European 
(EuroSTOXX 50) or US stock market implied volatility or the corporate bond spreads (see 
Fontana and Scheicher, 2016; Bernoth et al., 2012; Favero et al., 2010; von Hagen et al., 
2010). While global and common factors are important, since the financial crisis, more and 
more studies have highlighted how risk perception has recently been affected by 
idiosyncratic factors, rather than international factors (see e.g., Barrios et al., 2009).  
3.2. Contagion and multiple equilibria in the sovereign bond 
market 
Multiple equilibria are generally understood in a sovereign bond yield context as the result 
of self-fulfilling default crises which are often triggered by deep recessions. In fact, 
uncertainty regarding an economy’s future fundamentals, the government’s inability to 
commit ex ante to its debt-repayment and the investors’ risk aversion generate all together 
the possibility of a “bad” equilibrium whereby the government is forced to default even in 
the case of solvency or anyway non-negative developments in fundamentals. A formal 
model has been proposed, among the others, by Azariadis (1981), De Grauwe (2011), 
Corsetti and Dedola (2011; 2012). Multiple equilibria and the idea of contagion suggest a 
potential role for the central bank to coordinate market participants’ expectations away 
from the “bad” equilibrium. However, the central bank cannot remove the underlying 
                                                          
2 Eichler (2011), for instance, using data from American depositary receipt (ADR) of underlying stocks 
from Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland and Portugal for the period of Jan-2007 -Mar-2009, finds evidence 
that investors priced-in the risk of a EMU withdrawal but concludes that the perceived risk over this 
period was small. 
causes of fragility in sovereign bond markets related to weak or the lack of economic 
fundamentals (ECB, 2014). A broader discussion has been proposed recently also by De 
Grauwe and Ji (2016). 
3.3. Explaining euro area sovereign bond yield spreads 
To analyze the determinants of the yield spreads in the EMS and the Eurozone, we update 
the reduced form model proposed in De Grauwe and Ji (2012; 2013). Particularly, we 
specify the following fixed-effect econometric model: 
 
Sit = a + bFit + ai + uit                        (1) 
 
where Sit  is the yield spread of country i in period t. The spread is defined as the difference 
between country i’s 10-year government bond rate and the German 10-year government 
bond rate.  a is the constant term and  ai  is country i’s fixed effect. The latter variable 
measures the idiosyncrasies of a country that affect its spread and that are not time 
dependent. For example, the efficiency of the tax system, the quality of the governance, 
the population structure and many other variables that are country-specific are captured by 
the fixed effect. Fit is a set of fundamental variables.  A fixed effect model helps to control 
for unobserved time-invariant variables and produces unbiased estimates of the “interested 
variables”. 
In the second step, following De Grauwe and Ji (2013), we introduce time dummies into 
the basic model and the specification is as follows: 
 
Sit = a + bFit + ai + et + uit                      (2) 
 
where et  is a set of time dummy variables. This measures the common time effects that 
are unrelated to the fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed effects. If 
significant, it shows that the spreads move in time unrelated to the fundamental forces 
driving the yields. It will allow us to evaluate the importance of fundamental economic 
factors and time effects. The latter can be interpreted as market sentiments unrelated to 
fundamentals. To deal with possible differences in time effects between the core and 
periphery country groups, as suggested in the literature, we also introduce different time 
dummies. cet represents the common time effects for the core Eurozone group and pet for 
the periphery Eurozone group.  
 
Sit = a + bFit + ai + cet + pet + uit                                        (3) 
 
The set of economic and monetary variables 𝐹𝑖𝑡 include the most common fundamental 
variables found in the literature on the determinants of sovereign bond spreads.3 They are 
variables measuring the sustainability of government debt. We will use the debt to GDP 
ratio, the fiscal space of the government, the budget deficit, the current account position, 
                                                          
3 See e.g., Attinasi et al. (2010), Gerlach, et al.(2010), von Hagen et al. (2010), De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012), Aizenman and Hutchinson (2012), Beirne and Fratzscher (2012).  As discussed in the 
previous section, there is of course a vast literature on the spreads in the government bond markets 
in general.  
the real effective exchange rate and the rate of economic growth as fundamental variables 
affecting the spreads. The effects of these fundamental variables on the spreads can be 
described as follows.  
 When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt service 
increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an 
increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors demand to compensate 
them for the increased default risk. We also add debt to GDP ratio squared. The 
reason of focusing on the non-linear relationship comes from the fact that every 
decision to default is a discontinuous one, and leads to high potential losses. Thus, 
as the debt to GDP ratio increases, investors realize that they come closer to the 
default decision, making them more sensitive to a given increase in the debt to GDP 
ratio (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). 
As an alternative measure of fiscal sustainability, we will also use the fiscal space of 
the government. This is defined as the ratio of GDP to tax revenues. It has been 
used by Aizenman and Hutchinson (2013). It measures the capacity of governments 
to raise the taxes necessary to service the debt. An increase of the fiscal space 
variable raises the spreads. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio and the fiscal space variables are stock variables. As a 
robustness test it will also be useful to use the government budget deficit (a flow 
variable). This has the same expected effects on the spreads as the government 
debt to GDP ratio. 
 The current account has a similar effect on the spreads. Current account deficits 
should be interpreted as increases in the net foreign debt of the country as a whole 
(private and official residents). This is also likely to increase the default risk of the 
government for the following reason. If the increase in net foreign debt arises from 
the private sector’s overspending it will lead to default risk of the private sector. 
However, the government is likely to be affected because such defaults lead to a 
negative effect on economic activity, inducing a decline in government revenues and 
an increase in government budget deficits. If the increase in net foreign 
indebtedness arises from government overspending, it directly increases the 
government’s debt service, and thus the default risk. To capture net foreign debt 
position of a country, we use the accumulated current account GDP ratio of that 
country. It is computed as the current account accumulated since 2000Q1 divided 
by GDP. 
 The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be considered 
as an early warning variable indicating that a country that experiences a real 
appreciation will run into problems of competitiveness which in turn will lead to 
future current account deficits, and future debt problems. Investors may then 
demand an additional risk premium. 
 Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of servicing 
its debt. The lower the growth rate the more difficult it is to raise tax revenues. As a 
result a decline of economic growth will increase the incentive of the government to 
default, raising the default risk and the spread. 
The fundamental variables can be seen as “early warning” variables. They would be in the 
list of variables that agents trying to forecast the future sustainability of the government 
debt would use to make these forecasts. Thus, our model can be interpreted to use the 
current debt to GDP ratio (alternatively the current fiscal space) and the other fundamental 
variables to obtain forecasts of the future sustainability of the government debt.  
We could also have used the forecasts about the future sustainability of the government 
debt that were made in each period t. The IMF, for example, makes such forecasts. 
However, it appears that these forecasts are very unreliable producing large errors. In 
addition, there is the risk that these forecasts are not exogenous, i.e. that they depend on 
the spreads. Put differently, when the spreads increase, say on the Greek government 
bonds, forecasters typically react by adjusting their forecasts of the future sustainability of 
the Greek government debt. As a result of this endogeneity of the forecasts our estimates 
will be biased. For these reasons, we have not pursued this approach. 
From the preceding it follows that we can interpret the set of fundamental variables as 
signaling present and future solvency problems of governments issuing debt. Changes in 
these variables create spreads reflecting solvency risk. In contrast the time dummies that, 
as will be remembered, are independent from the fundamental variables and therefore are 
not associated with solvency risk, create spreads that by default should be associated with 
liquidity risks that arise from self-fulfilling fears that sovereigns may not be able to rollover 
their debt. 
There is a potential issue of omitted variables here. Our previous conclusion holds provided 
the model incorporates all relevant fundamental variables. If we fail to incorporate some 
relevant fundamental variables this conclusion will not hold anymore. We have used here 
the prevailing economic literature that has identified the fundamentals that matter. There is 
one exception, though. Some of the econometric studies of the spreads have used 
measures of risk such as the CDS-spreads as exogenous variables explaining the spreads in 
the government bond markets (see Aizenman and Hutchinson, 2012; Aizeman et al., 2013; 
Beirne and Fratzscher, 2012). We have criticized this approach in De Grauwe and Ji (2013) 
on the ground that these measures of risk are not exogenous variables. During moments of 
crisis risk perception increases and the sovereign debt and CDS spreads increase 
simultaneously. In no way can it be concluded that the CDS-spreads are exogenous 
variables causing the sovereign debt spreads to increase. Adding the CDS-spreads into the 
regression may improve the statistical fitness without however adding explanatory power. 
We run regressions on equation (1), (2) and (3) using a sample of the ten original 
Eurozone countries (without Luxembourg) during 2000-2015 (quarterly data). We did not 
select the countries that joined the Eurozone after the sovereign debt crisis. It would not be 
appropriate to include these countries as they experienced a very different monetary 
regime during most of the sample period. Note also that Germany is included as the 
benchmark country. 
After having established by a Hausman test that the random effect model is inappropriate, 
we used a fixed effect model to analyze the long-term bond spreads in the Eurozone. Table 
3 presents regressions of the Eurozone countries using the proposed fixed effect models. 
The standard errors (in brackets) correct for the existence of heteroscedasticity in the error 
terms and for contemporaneous correlation across panels. 
Regressions shown in columns (1) to (3) use the model with the debt to GDP ratio as a 
measure of debt sustainability. Regression (1) does not have time dummies; regression (2) 
adds common time dummies for all countries and regression (3) has separate time 
dummies for the periphery countries. Regression (4) adds the budget deficit to GDP ratio 
and regression (5) used fiscal space as the alternative measure of fiscal sustainability. 
We find that fundamental variables have a significant effect on the spreads in these 
regressions, except for the real exchange rate and the budget deficit variable. The fiscal 
space variable provides similar significant results as the debt-to-GDP ratio. Adding time 
dummies in regressions (2) and (3) has improved the R2 (goodness of the fit of the model). 
We conduct two F tests on the time dummies and both tests reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The first F test suggests that time fixed effects are 
needed and the regression with time dummies is shown in column (2) of Table 3. Moreover, 
the second F test suggests that different time fixed effects are needed for core and 
periphery country groups and the regression is shown column (3). 
Table 3   Estimation Results on Spread (%) 
Sample period: 2000Q1-2015Q2 
 
Note:  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Breusch-Pagan LM test is used confirm cross-sectional correlation in the disturbances.  
Standard errors are in brackets assuming that the disturbances are heteroskedastic and 
contemporaneously correlated across panels. 
Data sources: the government debt to GDP ratio, the fiscal space, the real effective 
exchange rate (defined as the relative unit labour costs and expressed as an index with 
base year 2005), the current accounts and the growth rate of GDP are all obtained from 
Eurostat. 
1F test on time dummies: F( 61, 544) =  5.10. F test rejects the null that the coefficients 
for all quarters are jointly equal to zero, therefore time fixed effects are needed. 
2F test on periphery time dummies: F(61, 483) =4.88. F test rejects the null that the 
coefficients for all quarters are jointly equal to zero, therefore different time fixed effects 
are needed for core and periphery country groups. 
3The time dummies in regression (3) are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Regression (3) gives the best R2 after allowing for two different time dummies on the 
periphery and core countries. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as follows. 
Increasing government debt ratios lead in a non-linear way to higher spreads. From the 
estimated coefficients of the linear and quadratic terms we find that the two terms together 
start being positive when the debt ratio reaches 149. However, to find the effect of changes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Debt GDP ratio  -0.0292* -0.0416*** -0.0745*** -0.0716***  
 [0.0153] [0.0150] [0.0166] [0.0184]  
Debt GDP ratio squared 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***  
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]  
Real effective exchange rate -0.0318 -0.3985 -0.7420 -0.7502 -0.8786 
 [0.8769] [1.0396] [0.9237] [0.9234] [0.9092] 
Accumulated current account GDP ratio  -0.6134*** -0.4849*** -0.4856*** -0.4830*** -0.8155*** 
(%) [0.1379] [0.1215] [0.1081] [0.1081] [0.1129] 
Growth rate of GDP -0.2301*** -0.3404*** -0.2259*** -0.2322*** -0.2596*** 
(%) [0.0393] [0.0531] [0.0457] [0.0524] [0.0510] 
Deficit GDP ratio    0.0160 0.0146 
(%)    [0.0317] [0.0307] 
Fiscal space      -3.5953*** 
     [1.0034] 
Fiscal space squared     0.7246*** 
     [0.2316] 
Time fixed effects (quarterly) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects periphery countries No No Yes Yes Yes 
F test on main economic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test on time dummies  Yes1             Yes3 Yes Yes 
F test on periphery time dummies   Yes2,3 Yes Yes 
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 
R2 0.660 0.784 0.866 0.866 0.857 
in the spread we have to take the derivative of -0.0745x + 0.0005x2 (where x = 
debt/GDP). This yields -0.0745 + 0.001x. Solving for x we find x = 74.5, i.e. when the debt 
ratio exceeds 74.5% increases in the debt ratio start increasing the spread. We show the 
estimated non-linear relationship between spreads and the debt to GDP ratio in figure A1 in 
appendix. 
The real exchange rate has the expected negative sign but the estimated coefficients are 
not statistically different from zero. The the economic growth variable has the expected 
negative and significant effect on the spreads, i.e. a decline in economic growth raises the 
spreads as it reduces the capacity of governments to generate tax revenues necessary to 
service the debt. This is a result that is often found in the literature (see Aizenman and 
Hutchinson, 2012, Beirne and Fratzscher, 2012). 
We also find a significant effect of accumulated current accounts on the spreads, however, 
the coefficient has the wrong (negative) sign. In De Grauwe and Ji (2013) several 
robustness tests were produced. First, it was found that in the pre-crisis period (1999-
2007) the coefficient of the accumulated current accounts is zero. The negative sign is 
obtained only for the post-crisis period. Second, when estimating the model for the core 
and the periphery countries separately, it is found that the negative coefficient only applies 
to the core countries. The periphery countries exhibit a coefficient equal to zero. Our 
interpretation is the following. The negative coefficient on the accumulated current account 
appears after the crisis and only in the subsample of core countries. The reason may be 
that core countries that had accumulated large current account surpluses (Belgium, 
Netherlands) also saw their spreads increase (vis-à-vis Germany) after the crisis. We 
conclude that the current account variable does not provide for a reliable estimate of future 
sustainability of the government debt. 
Statistical significance is one thing; economic significance is another one. We also want to 
know what the economic significance is of the fundamental variables. Put differently, we 
want to measure the quantitative importance of the fundamental variables in explaining the 
movements in the spreads. 
In order to obtain information on the economic significance of the fundamentals we have to 
compare these with the effect of the time dummy variable. We use regression (3) in Table 
3 with different time components for the core (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Italy) and the periphery (Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) Eurozone 
groups. We show the estimated time components (associated with regression (3)) in Figure 
4. The shaded areas indicate the time dummies that are significantly different from zero. 
This confirms the existence of significant time components that led to deviations of the 
spreads from the underlying fundamentals and thus were signaling risks unrelated to 
solvency. 
This time effect is especially pronounced in the periphery countries. In particular we find 
that in the periphery countries, there was a surge of the spreads during the sovereign debt 
crisis from 2010 to 2012 that was independent of the movements in the fundamentals. In 
2012 there was the OMT-announcement, and we observe that the spreads decline 
forcefully, again independently of the movements of the fundamentals. 
Thus, it appears that the announcement of OMT, by itself, triggered a large decline in the 
spreads that could not be associated with improvements in the fundamentals. 
The period prior to the crisis is also interesting. We find that prior to the crisis the time 
dummy becomes increasingly negative. This suggests that the financial markets were 
increasingly disregarding the fundamentals (some of which were deteriorating in the 
periphery) and kept the spreads close to zero. Put differently, investors appear to have 
disregarded the risks of holding sovereign debt from the periphery despite the warnings 
given by deteriorating fundamentals. The emergence of the crisis can be seen as a wake-up 
call, which then led investors to overreact and even to panic, producing spreads that 
(again) were out of line with the underlying fundamentals. The OMT announced by the ECB 
allowed the fear factor to disappear. This then led to a steep decline in the spreads, that 
again cannot be explained by the fundamentals in the model. All this seems to suggest that 
financial markets can easily switch from modes of risk-denial to excessive risk perception. 
 
Figure 4: Time dummies of spread (%) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note:  The vertical axis shows the coefficient of the time dummies using regression (3). It 
is to be interpreted as percentage points of the spreads. Thus when the coefficient of the 
time dummy is 5%, as it was in 2012, this means that the spreads were 5 percentage 
points higher than the spread as determined by the fundamentals. 
 
The next step in the analysis consists in estimating the contribution of the fundamentals 
and the time dummy in explaining the movements in the spreads. We perform this exercise 
during two periods. The first one is the crisis period, starting from 2008Q1 until 2012Q2 
(just before the OMT-announcement). The second (post-OMT) period runs from 2012Q3 to 
2015Q2. We show the results in Figures 2 and 3.   
We find that during the crisis period, the time dummy is by far the largest explanatory 
factor in explaining the surge of the spreads for Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In the case of 
Greece, fundamentals have a somewhat higher importance: they explain 44% of the surge 
in the Greek spread.  
The post OMT-period shows a similar pattern. The time variable explains by far the largest 
part of the decline in the spreads observed since 2012, suggesting that the decline in the 
spreads was made possible mostly by the OMT-announcement. Changes in the 
fundamentals do not seem to have contributed much in explaining this decline. 
Since we are interested in the influence of the government debt to GDP ratio, it will be 
useful to repeat the previous exercise and to isolate the separate effect of the debt to GDP 
ratio on the spreads during the two periods. We show the results of this exercise in Figures 
7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the decomposition during the crisis period 2008-12.  We find that 
the changes in the government debt to GDP ratio observed during that period contributed 
very little to the surge of the spreads. This surge is mainly explained by the time dummy, 
measuring market sentiments, and to a lesser degree by the deterioration of the other 
fundamentals (economic growth).  This suggests that the surge of the spreads during the 
crisis was unrelated to the movements of the most important fundamental variable, i.e. de 
government debt to GDP ratio.  
Figure 5: Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies to predicted 
changes in spread (%, 2008Q1-2012Q2) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note:  With “predicted” we mean the value of the spreads as estimated by the model.  
 
Figure 6: Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies to predicted 
changes in spread (%, 2012Q2-2015Q2) 
 
 























Change in fundamentals Change in time component (market sentiment)
Figure 8 shows the same decomposition during the post-OMT period (2012-15). Again, we 
find that the changes in the government debt ratio explain only a small fraction of the 
decline in the spreads. This decline is mainly driven by the market sentiment variable and 
by the other fundamental variables. As the latter improved somewhat they tended to 
reinforce the effect of market sentiments.  
In this empirical section, we have provided evidence showing that during the sovereign 
debt crisis the surge of the spreads was determined mostly by market sentiments, which 
we measured by time dummies that are independent from underlying economic 
fundamentals.  In addition, we found that the changes in the debt to GDP ratios observed 
during this period had practically no influence on the increase in the spreads. Other 
fundamentals, in particular, the decline in economic growth had some, but relatively small 
influence. 
Figure 7: Contribution of debt, other fundamentals and time dummy in 
changes in spread (%, 2008-2012) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Figure 8: Contribution of debt, other fundamentals and time dummy in 
changes in spread (%, 2012-2015) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
The conclusions from the empirical analysis of the post-OMT period are similar. The rapid 
decline in the spreads during 2012-15 was triggered mainly by positive market sentiments, 
which are likely to have been the result of the OMT-announcement. The changes in the 
fundamentals, and, in particular, the changes in the debt to GDP ratios, had very little 
impact on the spreads. 
These empirical results suggest that the sovereign debt crisis that erupted in 2010 and that 
led to spectacular increases in the sovereign bond rates of a number of countries was not 
the result of deteriorating government debt positions, but from market sentiments of panic 
and fear, and to lesser degree a decline in growth. Put differently, the surge of the spreads 
during 2010-12 was reflecting market sentiments in which panic and fear led investors to 
massively sell government bonds. These then in a self-fulfilling way triggered a liquidity 
squeeze making it increasingly difficult for the governments concerned to rollover their 
debt.  
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The above analysis shows that both fundamental factors (such as debt to GDP ratio, growth 
rate, current account balance) and market sentiment play significant role in the euro area 
sovereign bond yield spreads. Since late 2012, the announcement of the OMT certainly has 
removed the market sentiment factors leading to dramatic reductions in the spreads of the 
periphery sovereign bond markets. Following the ECB’s QE intervention in 2015, we 
observe three positive developments in the periphery countries and the euro are in general. 
First, as shown in Figure 9, the positive real GDP growth in the euro area has been 
gradually restored. Second, the current account balances have turned to surpluses in some 
euro member states as shown in Figure 10. Third, the debt to GDP ratios, though still high, 
have been stabilized as shown in Figure 1(b). These improvements of the fundamentals 
have certainly played a role in reducing the sovereign bond spreads. However, the 
improvements in the economic fundamentals as mentioned above remain insufficient. The 
real GDP levels in some Eurozone countries are still below their levels prior to the financial 
crisis. Therefore, we believe that QE could still play a positive role in supporting and 
restoring the economic fundamentals in the euro area. Our analysis of the recent 
developments in the bond markets suggest that pulling the plug on QE too soon might 
increase the refinancing costs of member states with little or no fiscal space.  
Our analysis also suggests that the government bond markets in the Eurozone are highly 
sensitive to changing market sentiments, both in time and across countries. Government 
bond markets can easily switch from modes of risk-denial to excessive risk perception. In 
addition these changing risk perceptions can affect countries very differently. Thus, it is key 
for the ECB to avoid creating perceptions that the (inevitable) future unwinding of QE will 
lead to different implications for the sovereign bond markets. Such divergences could 
trigger self-fulfilling crises and destabilizing capital flows between the member countries 
when investors pull their money out of the bond markets perceived to have become risky 
and into bond markets perceived to be safe. 
The recent ECB’s Council Decision (8 December 2016) to broaden the maturity range of 
public sector purchases by decreasing the minimum residual maturity for eligible assets 
from 2 to 1 years, and – “to the extent necessary” – removing the deposit facility flooring, 
imply that the problem of scarcity of bonds discussed in a previous note might not be 
binding in the medium-term. However, the 33% issuer limit implies that any extensions of 
QE purchases should be followed by a broadening of the universe of eligible assets – the 
latter being quite politically controversial (see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016).  
To avoid the risk of “QE infinity”, the Governing Council has an important role in the 
management of expectations in the euro area. Managing expectations in a monetary union 
with many different member countries is more difficult than in standalone countries. The 
challenge for the ECB when it will unwind its QE-program in the future is vastly greater 
than for the US-Fed. It will be important for the ECB to reassure the markets that if the 
unwinding of QE leads to liquidity crises in some of the sovereign debt markets it stands 
ready to use its OMT-program to support these markets. The announcement by itself will 
be sufficient to avoid volatile market sentiments from destabilizing the system during the 
process of unwinding QE. 
A return to stability at the European level can be achieved through supporting a full 
transition to a Capital Market and Banking Union, through the provision of federal 
guarantees for a smooth financial markets’ functioning. Steps in those directions have 
proved to considerably weaken the link between banks and public debt levels (for a 
discussion on the European Banking Union see Macchiarelli 2016; see also ECB 2014).  
Figure 9. Real GDP in Euro area (2010=100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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